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How Transnational Advocacy Networks Mobilize 
 
APPLYING THE LITERATURE ON INTEREST GROUPS TO 
INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
 
CHRISTINA KIEL 
University of New Orleans 
Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science 
 
 
 
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) receive increasing attention in international 
relations, but little has been written so far about the initial formation of networks and the 
ways concerned organizations or individuals build a transnational coalition. Difficulties 
of group mobilization pose a particular puzzle: Why do actors in one country organize 
around an issue in another country, especially when the resolution of the issue apparently 
benefits only local actors? When do national/international groups become active and how 
do local actors facilitate their mobilization? In this paper I argue that in order to get 
support from international organizations, local groups acting as entrepreneurs will frame 
the issue in a way attractive to the international organization. I apply concepts of interest 
group formation and mobilization to the case of the transnational advocacy network that 
formed in response to near-extermination of black-necked swans in the Carlos Anwandter 
Natural Sanctuary in southern Chile after the opening of a pulp mill in 2004.1 
 
 
 
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) have received increasing attention in 
international relations in recent years. Some TANs form in response to local problems, 
like recent resistance to the construction of dams in Chile’s Patagonia region;2 others 
coalesce around issues affecting many countries at once, like the international campaign 
to ban landmines (Mekata 2000), and others still contribute to the development and 
spread of norms, e.g. the rise to prominence of international women’s issues (Brown 
Thompson 2002). The main focus of previous research has been the question whether a 
specific campaign was successful in affecting domestic or international policy, and most 
                                                           
1 I would like to thank Professor Michael Huelshoff of the Department of Political Science at the University 
of New Orleans for bringing the case to my attention, for sharing the data he collected and for his advice 
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful comments on the previous draft of this paper.  The author can be contacted at ckiel@uno.edu. 
2 Global Greengrants Fund. “Patagonia’s Wildest Rivers Protected, For Now”. 24 June 2011. 
http://www.greengrants.org/2011/06/24/patagonias-wildest-rivers-to-be-dammed/, Accessed 29 June 2011. 
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of the literature focuses on campaigns that achieve their goals (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Mekata 2000; Donnelly 2002). Little has been written so far about the initial 
formation of networks and the ways concerned organizations or individuals build a 
transnational coalition. Difficulties of group mobilization pose a particular puzzle, 
especially for TANs that address local issues: Why do actors in one country organize 
around an issue in another country when its resolution apparently benefits only local 
actors? When do national/international groups become active and how do local actors 
facilitate their mobilization?   
Existing literature on TANs combines concepts of the social movements literature 
(Tarrow 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005) with constructivist theories on norms (Risse 
2000) and organizational theory on networks (Powell 1990). I propose that the literature 
in interest group formation can enrich the developing TAN field by explicitly modeling 
group mobilization. Clark and Wilson’s (1961) work on incentives and types of 
organizations and Salisbury’s (1969) “group entrepreneurs” can inform concepts used in 
the context of transnational advocacy, like the boomerang model developed by Keck and 
Sikkink (1998; see also Risse and Sikkink 1999).  
I apply concepts of interest group formation and mobilization to the particular 
case of the transnational advocacy network that formed in response to near-extermination 
of black-necked swans in the Carlos Anwandter Natural Sanctuary in southern Chile after 
the opening of a CELCO pulp mill in 2004. Local fishermen unions and tourism 
proponents fought the company, part of the industrial giant Arauco, demanding closure of 
the pulp mill they saw responsible for the demise of the birds. The local actors were 
supported by national NGOs, international groups, and even got the attention of the 
European Parliament. Seven years after the plant opened, and six years since coordinated 
action on several levels was initiated, the pulp mill is still operating, international 
attention has faded, and local action has ceased. This paper focuses on the initial 
mobilization of the international network. It joins recent contributions to the TAN 
literature probing motives of those making up advocacy networks (Mitchell and Schmitz 
2011, Carpenter 2011). My results show that beyond the analysis of TAN and target 
characteristics, a thorough assessment of TAN mobilization and success requires 
considerations of the dynamics between TAN members and within individual 
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organizations considering participation. Shared ideological convictions—underlined by 
the early TAN literature (Keck and Sikkink 1998)—are a necessary but not a sufficient 
factor for the emergence of a TAN.    
Most groups with an international focus are primarily interested in “big change” 
(e.g., stopping climate change or ending hunger worldwide). They increasingly use the 
international system to shape or create norms to this affect (Risse 2000). But despite their 
global approach, these groups need local issues. Local struggles can illuminate broader 
problems. They can become symbols. And they show that the group is taking action. 
International groups, therefore, have a strong interest in taking on local issues and 
campaigning in support of them. But how do they decide which local campaign they will 
take on? 
I argue that in order to get support from international organizations, local groups 
trying to influence the organization’s decision whether to become active in the campaign 
will frame the issue in a way attractive to the international organization. The international 
actor will join a campaign if the frame fits the organization’s broader mission and goals. 
My case study lends initial support to my hypothesis. 
 
Literature Review 
I first give a brief overview of the transnational advocacy literature and then show 
how research of interest group mobilization can further our understanding of TAN 
mobilization. Faced with a collective action problem people involved in advocacy need to 
offer selective incentives to potential participants. These benefits can be non-material, in 
particular when the campaign centers on ideological goals. Drawing on the literature of 
cultural framing, I develop my argument that local group entrepreneurs use different 
narratives of the campaign goals to attract different supporters. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) formalized the concept of transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs). The authors define TANs as “networks of activists, distinguishable 
largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation” (p.1). 
Networks have worked towards international justice, women’s rights, environmental 
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protection on international and local levels, and other issue areas.3 These networks 
usually consist of individuals and non-governmental organizations, but governmental and 
sub-governmental actors can play decisive roles. According to the literature, TANs 
develop in a number of ways. Sometimes they are planned in a meeting of like-minded 
activists (e.g. Mekata 2000). Other times a network develops out of existing contacts that 
coalesce and intensify around a specific issue (e.g. Evangelista 1995; Keck and Sikkink 
1998). One organization or small collective may start a campaign and other actors join 
the effort (e.g. Donnelly 2002). And sometimes local groups reach out to international 
organizations or sympathizers (e.g. Burgerman 1998). To account for the latter process 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) introduce the “boomerang effect”: when domestic avenues of 
influence are closed off to local advocacy groups, they may mobilize international allies 
who then lobby their own government to put pressure on the target state (see also Risse 
2000). The boomerang effect illuminates why a local groups may want to approach 
international actors. However, it does not explain why an international group would 
mobilize for the local actor. 
I compare the dynamics of individual groups joining a network of groups to the 
dynamics of individuals joining a group (Olson 1965).4 If we understand a transnational 
network as a “group of groups,” Olson’s collective action problem is relevant: Why does 
                                                           
3 A commonly accepted typology of TANs does not exist. Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) categorization uses 
TAN strategies as defining characteristics. Accosta (2008) distinguishes between “value-driven” and 
“project-driven” TANs. I agree that those TANs that address local issues, like specific development 
projects (Khagram 2002 describes a campaign against the building of a large dam) or national policies (for 
example the international support of national conservation policies, Princen 1995) are different from 
international campaigns that are directed towards global norm development and are usually centered around 
international organizations (Brown Thompson 2002 on the international women’s rights movement). The 
case analyzed in this paper falls into the second category: a local issue that (some) international support 
rallies around. Other examples of this type of TAN include protests against hydroelectric dams in Brazil 
(Rodrigues 2000) and the international campaign bringing attention to the disappearance of hundreds of 
women in Mexico (Mueller 2010). 
4 One might argue that it would be more appropriate to apply concepts of coalition-building among groups: 
the interest group literature postulates that groups decide to band together when it enhances their chances 
for success by pooling power and resources and by sharing costs (Hojnacki 1997). Furthermore, such 
alliances can signal legitimacy. TAN members’ calculations will be similar to those of their coalition 
counterparts. The difference between individual people and groups is that groups in a crowded interest 
group system would generally prefer working alone because they want to be clearly distinguishable from 
similar groups. This calculus, I argue, is different for groups considering joining a TAN. I believe that the 
decision-making process of groups whether to join a transnational network is closer to that of individual 
joining groups than groups joining a coalition: The calculations of TAN participants are about the value 
given to the public good, the resources at one’s disposal, the benefits joining will bring. Questions of 
competition should be minor because the other groups in the network will often be based in other countries, 
limiting competition over revenues, issues and members. 
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one group decide to join a collective effort? Pluralists starting with Truman (1958) assert 
that groups automatically will form in response to disturbances in the political system. 
Latent groups exist for every possible disturbance and mobilize when need be. For 
example, violations of human rights can be considered a disturbance. People who have a 
low tolerance for such abuses might respond to them with the formation of a group 
demanding to halt the violations. Seeing that people today know a lot about the world 
beyond their borders and are more interconnected than in the past, one might argue that 
mobilizing for issues abroad follows the same automaticity as mobilization at home. 
However, taking part in a group addressing a geographically distant disturbance is costly. 
Besides time, energy, and possibly membership dues that always accrue to group 
members, collecting information on a problem or preparing a response (e.g. coordinating 
with other groups, contacting media and government actors, or organizing protests) is 
much more cost-intensive if it happens half-way around the world. This will discourage 
participation. Thus, international group mobilization remains a puzzle.  
TANs, in particular those that address overarching international norms, may fit 
the definition of social movements as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which 
represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward 
distribution of a society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217). Recent research in this field 
(Rowley and Moldoveanu 2003) argues that participation in a movement can be an 
expression of one’s identity. In the TAN context, this might explain why individuals join 
organizations that address issues not affecting them personally. The perspective is less 
helpful in answering the question why a group in one country chooses to join a campaign 
based in another. 
One way of refining Olson’s by-product theory, which states people will only join 
in collective action towards public goods if they receive selective benefits, is to broaden 
the concept of selective benefits. Interest group researchers argue that these benefits do 
not have to be material. Clark and Wilson (1961) introduce the concept of incentives as 
organizational tools. They describe three kinds of incentives—material, solidary and 
purposive—and claim that individuals will not participate in group activity unless the 
group provides at least one form of incentives. Utilitarian organizations (e.g., businesses) 
are providers of tangible material incentives. Solidary organizations, on the other hand, 
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are structured around social activities and their rewards include participation in social 
events and social status. Members of solidary organizations take pride and satisfaction in 
the fact that they belong to a particular group, and the feeling of group identity may not 
necessarily be tied to the achievement of the group’s stated goals. Finally, purposive 
organizations are usually based on ideological goals, and achievement of these goals is 
drives participation: “The members are brought together to seek some change in the 
status quo, not simply to enjoy one another’s company” (Clark and Wilson 1961: 136). 
For members of this group the incentives to contribute to the group and participate in its 
activities are derived from feelings of accomplishments, of supporting “the cause” or 
“fighting the fight.”  
Transnational advocacy networks usually fall into the “purposive” category, with 
some solidary elements. TANs explicitly form to challenge the status quo. Individual 
activists do not expect material rewards for their efforts—they do want the campaign to 
succeed and fulfill its purpose. Transnational campaigns often target areas like 
international human rights or global warming—promoting ideals and general social 
change that do not necessarily affect individual participants directly. Many membership 
organizations participating in a TAN are purposive groups themselves. NGOs like 
Amnesty International or Greenpeace often join coalitions addressing local or 
international problems (e.g. Greenpeace international campaign to stop whale-hunting in 
Japan), the resolution of which does not provide their members any material benefits. But 
individual members of such purposive groups will expect purposive benefits–the 
perception that the stated goal is being advanced. Solidary benefits as defined by Clark 
and Wilson play a smaller role. During many campaigns, TAN members may never meet 
or socialize much beyond signing online petitions or loose coordination of strategies, 
primarily for logistical reasons. Sociability and fun are rarely the motivating factors to 
join. However, individuals may take personal gratification from joining transnational 
networks and feel strengthened in their identity as a global citizen. A group considering 
joining an existing network may look for prestige, in particular when it can be linked to 
powerful allies, and raise its own profile. But the primary driver of TAN mobilization 
will be purposive rather than solidary. 
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A group’s participation in a TAN thus depends on whether the issue around which 
the network forms fits the group’s agenda or mission. An environmental NGO could take 
up any issue that addresses an environmental problem. But there are environmental 
problems in every country of the world – how does a US non-governmental organization 
decide to campaign against water pollution in Chile, but not deforestation in Papua New 
Guinea? The TAN literature has largely neglected campaigns that did not happen.5 Even 
if a group of people and organizations share “ideas and values,” they do not always come 
together in a campaign. Why do some organizations that are a good fit for the TAN 
decide to stay on the sideline? Comparing these non-joiners to groups that do participate 
adds important insights regarding the processes and difficulties of TAN mobilization.  
Group entrepreneurs and their strategies can help explain which issues are chosen 
for advocacy. Salisbury’s exchange theory (1969) explores the role of interest group 
entrepreneurs who in exchange for some benefits (salary, political access, personal 
aggrandizement or other) take on the task of founding and maintaining a group. Nownes 
and Neeley (1996) posit that entrepreneurs are the most prominent factor for group 
formation, and Berry’s (1977) study of Washington, D.C. public interest groups finds that 
in 55 out of 83 mobilization cases an entrepreneur was instrumental. When it comes to 
international issues, entrepreneurs are important on both the local and the transnational 
level. Somebody has to be the one taking the first action, calling the first meeting or 
writing the first letter to the editor in response to a local problem. And somebody—
maybe the same person—has to start the effort of building a transnational coalition, 
contacting international nongovernmental organizations, the UN or international media.  
The local entrepreneur has to provide benefits to members of the TAN in order to 
maintain membership. The benefits for local participants will be different from those for 
internationals. Locally, a member of a group addressing an environmental problem, like 
air pollution, may expect benefits like money for health care, or changed environmental 
policies. She may also be interested in the companionship the group provides and the 
purposive benefit of feeling good about doing the right thing, supporting a green cause 
etc., but when facing a personal threat, practical considerations will probably be the main 
driver of mobilization. As Walsh states, “suddenly imposed grievances” such as 
                                                           
5 Exceptions include Carpenter (2007) and Huelshoff and Kiel (2011) 
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environmental disasters, may trigger mobilization (1981). The entrepreneur will have to 
provide benefits in form of practical progress towards ending local pollution or the 
member might leave the group.  
Benefits offered to potential international TAN members will not be material and 
rarely are they social (see above: beyond the feeling of a shared identity, solidary benefits 
like socializing with like-minded people can be incentives, but they are less common in 
transnational activism, at least socializing in person).6 Instead, the entrepreneur will have 
to provide purposive benefits; international groups need to recognize the local campaign 
as advancing their own mission. Tensions arise when the ideological goals of the local 
groups differ from those of the international group, which is likely (Torres 1997). While 
holding an oil company responsible for a spill can unite local and international groups in 
a campaign, local members have more personal interests—economic damage due to drop 
in tourism or a ban on fishing. Which purpose will the entrepreneur pursue with more 
energy? Demanding compensation for local businesses, or banning off-shore drilling? 
The fact that the entrepreneur (and the issue) is local might indicate that the local goals 
should have priority. However, if the local actor believes the collaboration of the 
international actor is essential for achieving the local goal, he might put the international 
group’s needs ahead of the local, in order to attract or maintain international support 
(Lerche 2008). The process by which the local actor describes the issue for maximum 
effect is called framing. Frames are “shorthand interpretations of the world” (Tarrow 
2005) and they are constructed by entrepreneurs to define goals, symbols and ideology 
(Zald 1996). Hansen’s (1985) model of interest group membership describes mobilization 
as a context-bound cost-benefit calculation. He points to the importance of information: 
“the format of the information people receive greatly influences its evaluation” (p. 82). 
For example, interest groups that address threats are more likely to attract supporters than 
those fighting for future benefits (see also Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  
As Tarrow (2005) points out: “No domestic claim is inherently interesting outside 
a country’s border unless it is framed to appeal to a broader audience” (p. 147). Bob 
(2005) explains how Mexico’s Zapatista movement redefined itself as an anti-neoliberal 
force in order to resonate better with international audiences. The framing process brings 
                                                           
6 Social media have created virtual spaces for socializing. 
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out “real though secondary elements of the underlying conflicts” (Bob 2005: 180), 
elements that speak to potential international supporters.7  Thus, framing plays an integral 
role in international participation in local campaigns, creating my primary hypothesis: 
Local groups frame the issue at hand to fit the international’s agenda, offering purposive 
incentives to the international group. 
There are other factors that help or hinder group mobilization in the TAN context: 
First, internal organizational considerations are decisive. Individual groups have to 
perform cost-benefit calculations when they decide whether to join an international 
campaign. International issues that provide fundraising opportunities (Huelshoff and Kiel 
2011), rather than just costing resources, will be attractive to international groups. Other 
organizational considerations are the potential effects new campaigns may have on 
ongoing efforts (Carpenter 2007) or existing relationships with other groups (Jordan and 
van Tuijl 2000).  
Second, existing personal connections between local and international actors can 
be activated by the local actor and will positively influence the international actor’s 
decision to join the TAN (e.g. Evangelista 1995). And third, the closed or open nature of 
the governmental system in the country under observation will influence TAN 
development as well (Risse-Kappen 1995, Sikkink 2005). 
 
Case Study 
Methodology 
The current research program on transnational advocacy networks is based 
primarily on case studies, an effective way to collect knowledge, especially in a relatively 
new field. Yanacopulos (2007) agrees that a case study approach is “helpful and 
necessary” for real-time phenomena (p. 44). While many studies of transnational action 
examine issues that simultaneously affect constituents in several countries—such as debt 
relief for impoverished countries (Donnelly 2002) or the campaign to stop worldwide 
elephant extinction (Princen 1995)—the transnational advocacy campaign targeting 
                                                           
7 An interesting observation regarding framing is that placing an issue in terms that raise interest abroad can 
lead to compromises in the initial goals of the local group. Lerche (2008) argues that the TAN campaigning 
for rights of the Indian Dalit caste framed the issue in a way more fitting to the philosophy of international 
actors than the affected population. 
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Chilean pulp manufacturer CELCO fits within another category of TAN studies: cases 
where transnational action is directed towards specific domestic actors in one country 
(e.g. Khagram 2002). Focusing on an example of this subset of cases is particularly 
beneficial when considering issues of mobilization, as international actors have less 
incentive to join local efforts than those that affect transnational issues or norms. In this 
sense, these cases present “crucial cases” in Eckstein’s (1975) definition. If actors who 
are geographically remote from the problem and do not stand to gain personally from a 
solution, we should not expect them to join a campaign. Applying Eckstein’s least-likely 
case scenario, I argue that if international organizations nevertheless join local 
campaigns, and if I can show that local entrepreneurs tailored the issue narrative to the 
international’s agenda, then my theory receives support. 
The limitations are obvious: generalizations cannot be drawn from a single case. 
However, a heuristic approach can be helpful in developing nascent theories and 
generating hypotheses (Sartori 1991). The case illustrates some mechanics, and even 
more so the difficulties, of group mobilization. It demonstrates variation in my dependent 
variable: despite similarities in group mission and past activism that would lead us to 
expect all of them to participate in the campaign, some international actors join the TAN 
and others did not. Contributing to these different outcomes – as hypothesized – is the 
way local entrepreneurs framed the issue. However, any findings remain tentative until 
the theoretical argument put forward is tested on additional cases. 
I test my hypothesis by comparing the language used by local entrepreneurs when 
talking to internationals and when talking to local or national audiences. News coverage 
of the issue in media and groups’ communications (like newsletters) might be different 
internationally compared to the local narrative, reflecting different information given to 
international groups and media outlets by local entrepreneurs. As an additional test of my 
hypothesis I will also examine whether there is more than one set of goals, identified by 
individual participant groups’ assessments of success. When international groups that 
were approached by local entrepreneurs have a different understanding of what 
constitutes success than local participants, this indicates that the initiator has laid out the 
purpose of the campaign differently to those internationals than to locals. Of course, 
divergent goals might be signs of weak institutionalization of the TAN, weak leadership, 
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or different worldviews. But I argue that in cases where an international actor joins the 
TAN in response to an entrepreneur’s request, the international group’s understanding of 
the issue will reflect the entrepreneur’s framing. I will describe international actors who 
show different levels of involvement in the campaign and explore whether their level of 
support can be tied to the local framing processes. 
The data collected for this paper are drawn from online media, in particular the 
Chilean English-speaking newspaper Santiago Times and personal conversations with 
persons involved in the campaign. I make use of data compiled by Dr. Michael Huelshoff 
(University of New Orleans) and developed in Huelshoff and Kiel (2011).    
 
Taking on CELCO 
Background 
Celulosa Arauco y Constitucion (CELCO), part of the wealthy and well-
connected Angelini Group, is one of the world’s largest producers of pulp, essential for 
paper production.8 In the mid-1990s, CELCO began construction of a new production site 
60 kilometers from Valdivia, in southern Chile. A plan to build a pipeline to dump 
effluents into the ocean at the village of Mehuin was abandoned when the local 
indigenous Mapuche Lafkenche population protested and even harassed CELCO 
engineers.9 When CELCO opened its plant in 2004, the company instead dumped the 
effluents into the Rio Cruces, one of the rivers flowing through the Carlos Anwandter 
Nature Sanctuary, home to various rare species of birds, among them one of the largest 
populations of black-necked swans in South America. The swans are at low risk of 
extinction, according to the International Union for Conversation of Nature.10 
Soon after the plant opened residents as far away as Valdivia complained about 
bad odors coming from the plant.11 A few months later, people noticed that the number of 
black-necked swans had decreased from an estimated 6,000 in 2004 to 289 in February 
                                                           
8 Reuters. 8 March 2011. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/08/arauco-chile-idUKN0814954320110308. 
Accessed June 30 2011 
9 Santiago Times. 28 August 2005. “Fishermen to Resist CELCO’s Waste Pipeline.” 
10 International Union for Conservation of Nature. Red List. Accessed 9 December 2010. 
http://www.iucnredlist.org/ 
11 Santiago Times. 9 March 2005. “Forestry Giant Fined for Irregularities in Valdivia Plant.” 
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2005.12 The people accused effluents from the CELCO plant to cause near-extermination 
of the swans. Also, residents seemed to become sick more frequently and pollution levels 
in the drinking water rose.  
In December 2004 CELCO released a report exonerating its plant and Chilean 
president Ricardo Lagos publically sided with CELCO. However, after an inspection by 
the National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) in early 2005 the mill was 
temporarily shut down and fined,13 then shut again when an independent report by the 
University of the Austral blamed CELCO for the environmental damage. The case 
became politicized when the State Defense Council found on 24 April 2005 that CELCO 
had “damaged the state” with its actions.14 CELCO appealed to the Supreme Court which 
overruled the earlier verdict. CELCO was allowed to restart production. However, shortly 
afterwards it was revealed that the reports presented to the Supreme Court as evidence 
had been forged.15 The scientists cited as supporting CELCO denied they had done so. A 
large demonstration in Chile’s capital that addressed, among other, the issue of the 
Valdivia plant, was broken up by police and several participants were arrested.16 Formal 
complaints were filed by members of Congress against judges of the Supreme Court17 
and President Lagos reversed his support for the company.18   
Local activists now actively approached international actors. Bernardo Reyes 
from the Institute for Ecological Politics went to Brussels in June 2005 where he 
addressed environmental groups and members of the European Parliament. Chile and the 
EU signed a free trade agreement in 2002, which includes provisions for environmental 
protection. The MEPs brought the issue in front of the European Commission, demanding 
that the issue be revised with the Chilean government. The also added the issue to their 
agenda for a meeting with Chilean parliamentarians in October 2005. European 
parliamentarians visited the CELCO plant in Valdivia in 2005. They even discussed a 
                                                           
12 ibid 
13 ibid 
14 Santiago Times. 24 April 2005. “CELCO Plant Charged with ‘Damage to the State’.” 
15 Santiago Times. 5 June 2005. “Chile Cellulose Plant Faces False Evidence Charges.” 
16 Santiago Times. 14 June 2005.” Arresting Development in Chile” 
17 Santiago Times. 12 July 2005. “CELCO Judges under Fire” 
18 NotiSur (South American Political and Economic Affairs). 29 July 2005. “Chile: Top Court Does Not 
Find CELCO Pulp Giant Guilty of Killing Swans; Plant Closes Nonetheless” 
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boycott of CELCO products.19 The Commission pushed the Chilean government to get 
serious about environmental issues, for example by establishing a Ministry of the 
Environment. A ministerial level government agency for the environment was also a 
requirement for membership in the OECD, which Chile was applying to join at the 
time.20  In August 2005 CELCO returned to its initial plan of dumping effluents in the 
ocean, but after a stand-off between the Mehuin fishermen and surveyors involving Navy 
ships with shots fired, the waste pipeline was abandoned once more.21 
The election of a new president in 2006 and the creation of a Ministry of the 
Environment the same year put pressure on CELCO. The Chilean National Commission 
for the Environment fined CELCO for illegally dumping waste.22 In 2007, scientists from 
the University of Austral found pollution of the Rio Cruces and the water of the sanctuary 
twice as high as it had been in 2004 and 2005.23 Yet CELCO continues to deny 
responsibility. An independent study in 2005 indeed found that CELCO was operating 
according to international standards (CNLT 2005) and while it has been proven that 
CELCO submitted false documents, it cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the 
company is responsible for the demise of the local swan population and other 
environmental damages.24 International attention waned and national and international 
activists moved on to other campaigns.25 Local protest in Valdivia fizzled out.26 When 
CELCO decided once more to dump the waste waters in the ocean instead of the river 
they approached the Mapuche population directly and offered money in exchange for 
harassment-free pipeline building.27 This has split the protest movement and makes 
consolidated action even more difficult.28   
Most groups that were active in 2005 no longer give the issue much attention. 
Seeing that CELCO still operates its Valdivia plant, that the company is again planning to 
                                                           
19 Santiago Times. 29 June 2005. “Foreign Minister Dismisses Revision of EU FTA Due To CELCO.” 
20 Santiago Times. 20 September 2005. “Chile Pushes for Admission into Exclusive OECD Club.” 
21 Santiago Times. 28 August 2005. “Fishermen to Resist CELCO’s Waste Pipeline” 
22 Santiago Times. 17 February 2007. “Chile’s CELCO Charged With Illegal Dumping, Accused of 
Environmental Terrorism” 
23 Santiago Times. 1 October 2007. “New Report Implicates CELCO in Swan Deaths” 
24 Telephone Interview with TAN participant. October 2010. 
25 Currently, plans to build several hydroelectric dams in Patagonia unite many of the international and 
national CELCO TAN members. 
26 Telephone interview with Ana Filippini. World Rain Forest Movement. 28 October 2010. 
27 Santiago Times. 27 August 2007. “CELCO Attempts to Buy Off Fishermen in Southern Chile.” 
28 Telephone Interview with Samuel Leiva. Greenpeace Chile. 9 November 2010. 
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dump effluents into the ocean, and that the black-neck swans did not return to the 
sanctuary, it is easy to conclude that the TAN did not achieve its goals of shutting down 
the plant. On the other hand, the Chilean government has taken steps towards stricter 
environmental regulation and the general public is more aware of environmental issues 
than just a few years ago, paying more attention and mobilizing around new challenges.29   
 
Analysis 
The campaign against CELCO started as a local reaction to the perceived 
environmental damage inflicted by the new plant in Valdivia. The formation of the initial 
protest groups can be explained with pluralist disturbance theory (Truman 1958): 
indigenous fishermen in Mehuin feared diminishing fish stocks if CELCO was to dump 
their effluents into the ocean and fought the plan of building a pipeline; residents in 
Valdivia were exposed to noxious smells and polluted water coinciding with the opening 
of the new plant and accused the company; and businesses relying on tourism were 
horrified to notice the decrease in numbers of the swans that made the Anwandter 
Sanctuary famous and drew lots of visitors30 and mobilized against the perceived culprit. 
These local actors--for respective reasons—all pursued the public good of stopping 
environmental damage. Olson’s (1965) by-product theory explains the local activists as 
high demanders: they have much to gain by organizing and will be the main beneficiaries 
of the public good, thus making the provision of material incentives to individual joiners 
less essential. However, when the campaign suffered setbacks and did not achieve its 
goals, individuals contributed less and less time and resources to the campaign. This 
shows that in order to sustain a campaign, additional benefits are necessary. 
As is often the case with TANs, the relationship between members was only 
minimally institutionalized. The “Coordination for the Defense of the Cruces River 
Nature Sanctuary” was founded as an umbrella organization for local and national 
organizations. International actors, except for those NGOs that have representation in 
Chile, for the most part seem to have acted outside of the loose structure, connected to the 
TAN primarily through individuals (see in particular the involvement of members of the 
                                                           
29 Telephone interview with Aaron Sanger. ForestEthics. 11 November 2010. 
30 The Valdivia tourism industry experienced a 60% drop in activity in 2005. Santiago Times. 7 November 
2005. “Valdivia Tourism Teeters in Wake of CELCO Disaster” 
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European Parliament). Because the TAN had only a very loose structure, it is difficult to 
reconstruct which international actors should be counted as members. Some of the 
international organizations mentioned in media reports as supporting the campaign are 
Oceana, Greenpeace, and individual members of the European Parliament. 
Valdivia residents and local activists came together in the “Accion Por Los 
Cisnes” (“Action for the swans”) coalition. While there does not seem to be one 
dominant figure in the protest movement, some names of local activists are mentioned 
repeatedly in the media as leaders and are referred to by other members. There are at least 
three I would name as driving forces throughout the period of protest: Eliab Viguera in 
Valdivia, a local union activist who forged alliances with the local Mapuche population 
and continued the struggle even after CELCO began buying off local fishermen; Vladimir 
Riesco, the lead lawyer in the case and contact for some international groups, including 
the World Rainforest Movement;31 and Bernardo Reyes of the Santiago Institute for 
Ecological Politics who reached out to European NGOs and politicians in order to 
increase the size and influence of the TAN. Viguera seemed to focus his efforts on 
maintaining local cooperation, while Reyes reached beyond Chile. 
Nationally and internationally, there was no immediate feeling of threat that might 
spur group creation (no evidence indicates a new state-level group formed). But existing 
groups with an interest in the public good of a clean environment turned their eyes to 
Valdivia. The World Rainforest Movement in Uruguay published on the matter starting 
in 2004 (WRM 2004). International groups with offices in Santiago, like Greenpeace and 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), became involved. WWF commissioned a report,32 and 
Greenpeace provided legal advice to local activists.33 These are purposive groups 
(although they provide selective benefits to members as well, e.g. a WWF credit card or 
the Greenpeace newsletter) with general mission statements: Greenpeace seeks “solutions 
to environmental dilemmas;” and the WWF’s “ultimate goal is to build a future where 
people live in harmony with nature.” For both organizations, taking on the CELCO case 
                                                           
31 WRM. Bulletin 109, August 2006. http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/109/Chile.html, accessed 29 June 
2011. 
32 Telephone interview with Ricardo Bossard, WWF, 27 October 2010 
33 Telephone interview with Samuel Leiva. Greenpeace Chile. 9 November 2010 
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as a transnational campaign would have been conceivable. But while Greenpeace became 
very active in the campaign, WWF was so to a much lesser degree.  
The reasons for different levels of engagement are multi-dimensional. 
Organizational considerations like existing agreements with parties to the dispute are 
decisive, e.g. ForestEthics, a US based environmental group, had recently signed an 
agreement with the CELCO’s parent company Arauco committing themselves to more 
sustainable and ecologically friendly policies; the organization subsequently supported 
the campaign against CELCO but did not undertake any specific activities.34 These 
dynamics are discussed elsewhere (Huelshoff and Kiel 2011). The importance of personal 
contacts becomes clear when considering how the European Union got involved—
existing ties between Bernardo Reyes (Institute for Political Ecology) and European 
activists made it possible for him to connect to members of the European Parliament, 
which opened an important avenue in the fight against CELCO. The openness or 
closeness of the target state’s governmental system may explain the very loose form this 
particular TAN took; Chile’s government was sufficiently closed-off to societal demands 
that it made sense for some activists to reach beyond national borders (in particular, the 
close ties of government and business discouraged the local movement), but at the same 
time responsive enough that many national and local members seemed to doubt the 
necessity of international contributions.35  
My hypothesis states that local activists will approach different actors with 
different narratives of the issue, highlighting aspects of the fight against CELCO that will 
make it more likely that the international group will join the campaign. Participants 
indeed confirm that framing occurred and different narrative strands can be detected, 
confirming the first part of my hypothesis. 
According to a member of the TAN, “local people usually wanted to stress 
different things according to different groups (for ex. [sic] the death of the fauna for bird 
watchers etc.)”36 Another participant agrees that in order to engage people, one uses 
images that speak to them, but he insists that the swans were the most important issue.37 
                                                           
34 Telephone interview with Aaron Sanger. ForestEthics. 11 November 2010. 
35 Several interviewees mentioned some local resistance to help from outside. 
36  Email Ana Filippini. 10 June 2011. 
37 Email Samuel Leiva. 14 June 2011. 
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When talking to the media or other outsiders, the black-neck swans were central to the 
narrative. They were the uniting symbol of the campaign. Across the board all TAN 
members interviewed and news stories mention the birds as primary victims of the 
pollution. The symbol of the swans was useful nationally where it focused a nation’s 
awakening demands for environmental protection.38 It was also applied internationally to 
connect an image to the environmental disaster unfolding in Valdivia. But apart from the 
swans, different narratives and diverging descriptions of the goals of the campaign 
confirms the conclusion that local activists framed the issue differently for international 
audiences.  
As explained above, the local protest movement consisted of fishermen, tourism 
businesses and local environmentalists. Their goal was to shut down the CELCO plant. 
Local media emphasized local impacts of the ecological disaster, e.g. “Valdivia tourism 
teeters in wake of CELCO disaster” (Santiago Times, 7 November 2005) and included 
local concerns in their reporting. For example, a representative of the Valdivia activists 
said, “The damage is not just to the swans, it’s to public health, the water, the soil, our 
future projects, our jobs, everything.”39 Increased health concerns and the fear of 
detrimental effects on businesses were prominent in the local narrative. In interviews 
with international participants, they do not talk about these specific problems without 
being prompted. The narrative of international actors in these interviews focuses on 
pollution more generally and on the situation in Valdivia as a symptom of the disregard 
of environmental concerns in Chile. 
An interesting example of diverging narratives is the EU-Chile free trade 
agreement: Only two of 37 newspaper articles addressing the CELCO case from a 
local/national perspective mention the EU-Chile free trade agreement and the fact that 
CELCO’s actions may lead to a revision of this agreement.40 The European Union wrote 
in 2007 in a communication regarding CELCO: “The protection of the environment and 
the promotion of sustainable economic development are primary concerns of the 
                                                           
38 Telephone Interview with Aaron Sanger, ForestEthics. 11 November 2010 
39 Santiago Times. 12 January 2005. “Chile’s Government Slammed for Inaction on Environmental Crisis.” 
40 The FTA did not include specific environmental issues, but environmental sustainability is central to the 
EU’s philosophy. Members of the European Parliament considered calling for a boycott of Chilean 
products because they were concerned that “a rise in trade should be the other side of the coin t the 
destruction of the environment.” Santiago Times. 29 June 2005. “Foreign minister Dismisses Revision of 
EU FTA Due to CELCO.” 
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European Union.” The fact that EU representatives highlight this argument in interviews 
and communications (while the swans are less prominent) demonstrates that the EU uses 
a different frame for the issue.  
Inconsistent evaluations of the success of the campaign are another indication that 
groups within the TAN did not share one unified perspective. Some international groups 
see much positive coming out of the CELCO campaign. The World Wildlife Fund (as a 
less involved participant) claims that the campaign as a success because it played a key 
role in increasing Chileans awareness of environmental problems.41 This was a stated 
goal for this organization (see above). Greenpeace adds to that assessment that Chile’s 
new environmental institutions are a big step forward.42 Another member of the TAN, the 
World Rainforest Movement calls these institutions useless, showing the disunity of 
purpose.43 I have no clear evidence that the diverging messages local and international 
TAN members sent during and after the campaign can be traced back directly to 
entrepreneurs’ contradicting appeals, but the different frames employed early on will 
have influenced the goals set by the individual organizations. Further research is needed 
to determine the exact causal mechanism. 
I confirm that entrepreneurs use framing to make the issue attractive to outsiders. 
According to my hypothesis, these frames must contribute to the outsider’s decision 
whether to join the campaign. International organizations will hesitate to admit that they 
joined because locals used a particular narrative - “framing” may sound to them like 
“manipulation.” Therefore, my evidence remains circumstantial. I focus on four 
international actors: Greenpeace, the World Rainforest Movement, a group of members 
of the European Parliament, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). 
Greenpeace had been monitoring the CELCO pulp mill construction and 
successfully campaigned for a more stringent environmental impact assessment. Thus, 
when environmental damages became apparent, the group was easily convinced to join 
local efforts, because the campaign was seen as a continuation of earlier efforts.44   
                                                           
41 Telephone interview with Ricardo Bossard, WWF. 27 October 2010 
42 Telephone interview with Samuel Leiva, Greenpeace. 9 November 2010. 
43 Telephone Interview with Ana Filippini, World Rainforest Movement. 28. October 2010. 
44 Email Samuel Leiva, Greenpeace. 14 June 2011. 
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The World Rainforest Movement actively participated in the campaign against 
CELCO and is still following the issue in 2011.45 A representative for the group 
acknowledges that local groups used framing to attract international participants, 
referring to images that resonated with the outsider. Once they became involved, 
international groups in turn tailored narratives to attract further support: “For us the 
variety of negative impacts are very important […] and depending of the people that 
could get involved we could stress one or the other.”  
Members of intergovernmental bodies (e.g. representatives of the European 
Parliament) can be TAN participants. In fact, their political clout makes them desirable 
additions to the network. Much of the TAN literature discusses the “boomerang” local 
activists employ in order to circumvent closed domestic decision-making processes and 
get a powerful outsider (a foreign government or international organization) to put 
pressure on the national government (Thomas 2002, Risse and Sikkink 2005). But in 
order to attract powerful sub-governmental allies and get the issue at hand on their 
crowded agenda, local activists will have to use language that fits the international 
organization’s goals. 
The European Union took up the issue after Bernardo Reyes presented it to 
members of the European Parliament in Brussels. The details of the meeting are not 
known, but the fact that the EU narrative centered on different issues than the local 
campaign indicates that the MEPs received information that made the CELCO issue a fit 
for them. This narrative would have to go beyond local impacts of pollution, widening 
the problem to include “real, though secondary elements” (Bob 2005: 180) like distortion 
of competition due to low environmental standards or appeals to promote the European 
Union’s sustainability platform. The frame that attracted the EU moved the focus from 
the Valdivia plant to the lack of environmental norms and regulations in Chile more 
generally. Including the problems in Valdivia as part of the EU-Chile dialog was one of 
several (including the OECD membership) impetuses for the eventual establishment of a 
ministry for the environment and for advancing international norms on environmental 
issues in Chile. When there was evidence of emerging norms and institutions on the 
national level, the EU claimed success and backed off. This behavior shows that while a 
                                                           
45 Telephone Interview with Ana Filippini, World Rainforest Movement. 28. October 2010 
  
Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced international Studies | 96 
 
frame highlighting norms can attract a powerful ally and give momentum to a campaign 
it does not guarantee the achievement of the goals set by the local activists.  
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is an example of a situation where a lack of 
framing contributed to limited engagement of the group in the campaign. After learning 
about the problems in Valdivia, WWF officials declared that the Fund should become 
active through its forestry industry program. However, WWF’s involvement remained 
low. WWF commented publicly on the environmental damages and commissioned a 
report (ScienceDaily 2005, WWF 2005), but the organization felt that it could not 
contribute much expertise to the CELCO case, because “we know a lot about forest, but 
not so much about industrial processes”.46 It seems that the issue could have been framed 
more appropriately in terms of biodiversity, which might have encouraged WWF to be 
more active, but such conscious framing did not happen.47  
The international actors discussed demonstrate that the narratives used by TAN 
members can influence the decision of international groups whether to join a campaign 
and how involved they will be. Where frames “fit,” as in the cases of Greenpeace, WRM 
or the EU, those outsiders become active in the campaign. Where they do not, as in the 
case of the WWF, the international organization was less engaged.  
 
Conclusion 
A cause that advances the international group’s agenda entails purposive benefits, 
e.g. the feeling of accomplishment when ideological goals are reached, which are 
important for the group’s mobilization and maintenance. Thus, international group 
entrepreneurs will be more interested in issues that provide potential for purposive 
benefits than in issues that are as worthwhile, but cannot be tied to a specific program or 
organizational goal. When local activists find a narrative that resonates with the 
international group’s own mission, this group is more likely to join the campaign. I find 
tentative support for my hypothesis: cultural framing can be an effective tool for local 
entrepreneurs when approaching international actors. 
                                                           
46 Telephone interview with Ricardo Bossard, WWF, 27 October 2010 
47 Email Ricardo Bossard. 21 June 2011. Also, the focus of WWF in Chile is getting producers of wood 
products to use forests that are managed according to Forest Stewardship Council guidelines. Arauco’s 
cooperation is needed for the implementation of the FSC certification program. This is another example of 
how appropriate frames may be necessary, but not sufficient conditions to attract outsiders to a campaign. 
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I admit that my results are not generalizable as they are based on one single 
campaign, even though I apply my hypotheses to a number of international groups. But I 
feel confident that this paper, despite its limitations, makes important contributions to the 
TAN research program.  
Firstly, my substantive findings challenge the assumption often found in research 
on TANs that international actors will mobilize for local causes simply because of shared 
ideological convictions. I do not deny that a group’s principles and moral beliefs are 
central to their decision-making process, but the present case study supports my argument 
that international groups are more likely to join campaigns if local group entrepreneurs, 
in search for international support, will frame the issue at hand in ways palatable to the 
outsider. However, in order to have more confidence in this finding, more research is 
needed. A clearer picture of what exactly local activists said to international actors and 
how important the form and content of this presentation was to the international group’s 
decision to join – or not to join – the campaign against CELCO can only evolve in long 
conversation with those involved in the campaign. Broadening the analysis from the 
single case to a small N study would allow for cross-case comparisons. I might compare 
this case to similar ones in the region.   
Secondly, I argue that it is not enough to focus on the outcomes and effects of 
transnational campaigns. The dominant approach has ignored interesting questions, e.g. 
why international groups mobilize for local causes or how initiators of campaigns get 
other actors to join. I show that the literature on interest group mobilization offers ways 
to analyze these new important questions. Applying concepts established by the interest 
group literature can enrich the TAN literature. This paper is a first attempt at doing just 
that. 
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